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I. The Problem is not Consensual Participation  
 
§ 1. One problem of the liberal defences of the existence, exchange and consumption of 
pornography is that these liberals are defending a pornography which is, by contemporary 
standards, innocent. It is easy to defend the actress who participates in a standard sex film 
as being able to decide for herself and to accuse the critic of pornography1 of relying on a 
puritanical social context to argue she would much prefer to be a teacher or lawyer, if only 
she knew her real interests, but not so easy when “The user is bombarded with images of 
mascara running, hair being pulled, throats in a vicelike grip, nostrils being pinched so 
women can’t breathe as the penis fills the mouth, and mouths that are distended by either 
hands pulling the lips apart or penises inserted sideways.”2 When Ronald Dworkin, for 
example, defended the free speech of pornographers, he was concerned with a minority 
issue and perhaps quaint stag films which no more resemble the actual pornography of 
today than Milton’s Paradise Lost is to be judged by the understandings of contemporary 
novels.3 Such violent images of humiliation are, however, also present in mainstream 
                                                          
1 In this article the “critic of pornography” remains somewhat anonymous just because it is a 
rhetorical amalgamation of several views.  
2 Gail Dines, Pornland: How Porn Has Hijacked Our Sexuality (Boston: Beacon Press, 2014), xix-xx. 
3 Ronald Dworkin, “Is There A Right to Pornography?” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1.2 (1981): 177–
212. For a deeper discussion of Dworkin and his liberalism, see David Rose, The Ethics and Politics of 
Pornography (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 87-7, 107-12, 164-67.  
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imagery: Spiderwoman’s binding by Hangman, the bound and flagellated Ornella Muti in 
Flash Gordon, and the suspended naked woman in Hostel: Part II.4  
 
 
Fig. 1: Guido Crepax, Valentina vol. 5 (Roma: Blue Press, 1995): 9. 
 
§ 2. The problem of humiliation and pain in pornographic and non-pornographic 
representations is not one of consent. If it were, the above image or the words of the 
Marquis de Sade (where there are no participants and no victims) would be morally 
uninteresting. They are not. The use of minors in the production of pornography is 
explicitly forbidden, but the simulation of minors through animation in hentai, the 
techniques to make actors appear younger, as well as literary descriptions of sexual 
relationships with minors is also (putatively) morally and legally forbidden. Consent is not 
the be all and end all in those cases either. 
 
§ 3. Even if one were to ignore the interest in violent images without participants and 
concentrate on pornographic films or photographic images of humiliation and pain where 
actors or models are represented in pain or being harmed, then consent would still not be 
an issue. It is empirically true that certain individuals enjoy sexual practices involving 
humiliation, pain and bondage. A liberal state cannot dictate which activities are permissible 
once consent is given by the participants (one can beat another in the boxing ring or the 
dojo) and in a free market, representations of such activities can be organised, recorded and 
exchanged for money. Like boxing, limits can be put on when, how and identify the 
appropriate health and safety regulations as well as restricting who can consume and when 
(to mitigate problems of damage to immature minds and public decency), but such activities 
cannot be prohibited without finding evidence of coercion or reckless harm.  
 
                                                          
4 Marv Wolfman “Hell is the Hangman!”. Spiderwoman. 1.4. (New York: Marvel Publications, 1978); 
Mike Hodges, dir. Flash Gordon (Starling Films, 1980): 111 mins; Roth, Eli, dir. Hostel: Part 2 
(Lionsgate, 2007): 94 mins. 
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§ 4. However, some may claim that no participant in recorded material involving sexual 
violence would do so willingly.5 In the interest of art, pain and privation are intelligible 
within rational limits (actors often suffer for specific roles), but participants in sexually 
violent material would obviously prefer to earn their money as a teacher or a lawyer, it is just 
that economic necessity coerces them to “consent” to the activity. 
 
§ 5. Such an assertion is unfair and problematic since it assumes that one is unable to make 
such decisions properly on one’s own. Many individuals do jobs which they would prefer 
not to or would prefer to do something else. Exploitation occurs when the individuals are 
forced to participate in activities with excessive risks of harm or due to unfair pressure by 
employers, but in such cases robust employment law is in place to protect these individuals. 
Exploitation occurs in all industries and would be as wrong in circus performers and cockle 
pickers as in pornographic actors. The nature of the activity is incidental to the wrongdoing. 
The rights of the actresses are covered by Health and Safety and Employment Law and is 
no different to the job performance of a stunt artist. One assumes that the actresses in 
Wasteland also have their rights protected (given the professional nature of the production) 
and the harm they suffer is consensual.6 Consent sets a limit to the degree of privation an 
actor is prepared to suffer for his or her art. 
 
§ 6. Yet, as in dangerous work, the actual fact of making such material is often taken as 
evidence that the actors do not do so freely. Just like the actor who plays the role of the 
victim in a snuff movie, there is no rational way they would agree willingly to participate. 
There is however a difference between a snuff movie and sexually violent material. When 
one encounters the agent apparently intending to willingly act in a snuff film, just as when 
one is confronted by an agent intending to commit suicide, it is eminently sensible and quite 
right to mistrust his or her avowed intention. At the very least, one would demand to know 
more about his or her motivations rather than the immediate surface desire and ensure that 
any decision is freely and rationally taken (which begins from the very high bar of being 
nigh on impossible). Given § 2, though, if sane adults tell one that they enjoy sadistic and 
masochistic practices, it is plausible. And if a particular actor enjoyed her work in sexually 
violent films, was good at it and found satisfaction in it, more so than in teaching, being a 
lawyer or working in a factory, then one could only contradict her at the cost of her own 
rationality, to treat her as not autonomous and to decide for her the types of lives and 
values which are worthwhile. In the snuff movie, we probably know better what the actor 
wants (not his death), but it is not so obvious that, in the cases of the boxer and the BDSM 
actor, one is not guilty of assuming one knows better than others. As good liberals know, 
outside non-controversial issues of public health and obvious cases of impaired rationality, 
any claim that a subject is suffering from bad faith, false consciousness or ideological 
distortion is hard to establish given the long series of historical efforts by moralists choosing 
for the sake of others. To do so, is to assume that such participants are not fully rational 
and that is to undermine the autonomy of individuals for the sake of a commitment to a 
value of the worthlessness of an activity that others may not share. No matter how much 
                                                          
5 Catherine Mackinnon, Only Words (Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
6 Graham Travis, dir. Wasteland (Elegant Angel, 2012): 134 mins. Travis’s film is an example of the 
mainstream-adult industry boundary whereby a pornographic film goes beyond the gratuitous use of 
images for arousal to attempt to express meaning. The end scene is a crescendo of sexual violence 
between two competing-recognising female self-consciousnesses. The males (many masked) remain 
largely identity-less and nothing but the distribution of a negated objectification. It is not wholly, I 
should stress, an aesthetic success. 
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we object, the right to free speech protects the individual from interference by more 
powerful agents (the state, religions and so on). We must tolerate those who have tastes 
different from our own and pursue ways of life which do not share some of our values. 
 
II. A Matter of Taste   
 
§ 7. The claim about really not wanting to participate in such films hides a negative opinion 
on such activities. If one wants to spend one’s time jogging, crocheting or skiing, that is 
one’s own business. If one wants to spend one’s free time killing random passers-by then 
that is the business of the state because it involves non-consensual harm to others, unlike 
boxing which involves consensual harm. If one wants to enjoy participating—or watching—
sexually violent imagery, and such imagery has been produced with the consent of the 
participants, then it is no different to participating—or watching—a boxing match. Any 
argument against its production and consumption is then based on value judgements: the 
activity is not worthwhile, is not what you should be doing. And one cannot help feeling the 
same sort of puritanism here about pornography in general: one should not watch this, it is 
trivial, of no value. One should not watch these films or enjoy these films, as it is evidence 
of baseness. 
 
§ 8. Human beings enjoy many trivial and valueless activities. Defenders of these images 
may say that they are art, that they are media for the expressions of deeper truths of human 
existence. One ought to here be more forthright and less disingenuous. There are good and 
bad pornographic films just as in all other genres and one does not want to limit oneself to 
defending only those of artistic value, howsoever such a value is to be established. One 
should not be afraid to say one watches pornography to be aroused. One watches horror 
films to be scared, to feel emotions of fear, and one watches pornographic films to be 
aroused, to feel feelings of arousal. And one watches, reads and consumes sexually violent 
images, bondage and BDSM in order to be aroused.  
 
§ 9. The representation of sexual violence involves cruelty, harm and humiliation. 
Consumers enjoy and take pleasure from seeing others harmed, humiliated and abused. The 
judgment which requires thought is that: one should not enjoy consuming images of sexual 
violence, humiliation and cruelty. When watching such material, if a third person were to 
spy you, they would exclaim: “How can you be aroused by that? There is something wrong 
with you…”7 And because it is normative, it grounds legal and moral claims for the 
prohibition, censorship of violent pornography. The judgement one makes is: “You ought 
not to consume images or representations of sexual violence” or “One should not enjoy 
consuming images of sexual violence, humiliation and cruelty.” But do we mean that there 
                                                          
7 Here I want to sidestep the paradox of horror, the puzzle about why people want to watch images 
that elicit negative attitude or emotions. See Noel Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror, Or, Paradoxes of the 
Heart (New York: Routledge, 1990); Noel Carroll, "Enjoying Horror Fictions: A Reply To Gaut," The 
British Journal of Aesthetics 35.1 (1995): 67-72; Berys Gaut, "The Paradox Of Horror," The British Journal 
of Aesthetics 33.4 (1993): 333-45; Berys Gaut, "The Enjoyment Theory Of Horror: A Response To 
Carroll," The British Journal of Aesthetics 35.3 (1995): 284-89; Matthew Strohl, "Horror and Hedonic 
Ambivalence," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70.2 (2012): 203-12. With sexually violent 
images, viewers are aroused by images that are disquieting, that, if real, would disturb. Here there is a 
difference from the paradox of horror in that though there is something to explain, there is more 
pertinently something to justify or excuse oneself for. With horror we have an explanatory problem, 
with violent pornography we have a normative problem. The former is a problem of psychology and 
not philosophy.  
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is something wrong with me if I “enjoy” or am aroused by it, or do we mean that I should 
not do it, even if I enjoy it (like smoking or squishing ants)?  
 
§ 10. The claim that you ought not to consume it (if true) gives legislators the justification to 
ban it. To prefer Black Sabbath to Beethoven is a case of bad taste. However, it is one’s 
own prerogative to prefer to listen to Sabbath rather than Ludwig. In the British 
philosophical tradition, desires and preferences are non-rational, they are natural facts.8 Yet, 
even in matters of taste we often state that one may well like X but ought to, all things 
considered, prefer Y. Beliefs, experiences and idiosyncrasies determine the individual’s 
relation to a given object. When one prefers KFC to a Michelin starred restaurant, or Black 
Sabbath to Beethoven, one is guilty of bad taste (allegedly). The best that “bad taste” can 
signify is that one’s pleasures are abnormal, unusual and not shared. 
 
§ 11. One who likes the flavour of faeces, though, is a pervert because, all things considered, 
one ought not to like the flavour of shit (for natural reasons). One who is aroused by images 
of sexual violence is perhaps a pervert.9 One possible explanation of such perversions and 
“ought” judgements of taste is the prudential one: we have many desires and they conflict. 
One desires to smoke but one desires a long and happy life. We can make mistakes about 
which desire should have priority or will be stronger. So to like the taste of faeces is a 
perversion because our natural organism has evolved to identify harmful substances with 
unpleasant flavours. In normal circumstances, those desires which are best suited to the 
furtherance of the organism will have priority. So, for example, you should not smoke 
because it does not benefit, but harms us. Your pleasure for the instant ought to be 
sacrificed for the pleasure of health. 
 
§ 12. But this does not work. There are no competing desires about health and sexual 
violence, nor economic ones (imagine arguing someone should not buy a Rolls Royce 
because it harms their long-term interests, or one should not play computer games because 
it damages one’s memory). There is no long-term damage which seems to result from the 
consumption of violent imagery.10 There might be from the participation in it, but no more 
than the risks when one snowboards or rock climbs. And these sports are televised for the 
entertainment of the masses. Any moral degradation will be no more that playing Grand 
Theft Auto on a console. (See § 27.) 
 
§ 13. To talk about perversion, one might need to turn to a slightly different tradition of 
philosophy and the purification of desires.11 Imagine finding a dying cat on the road who is 
beyond medical help. The animal is obviously suffering, and this could be alleviated by 
ending its life there. You want to help, but you are also revolted and want to run and ignore 
its plight. However, you recognise that the right thing to do, the act of which others would 
approve, is to help and end the cat’s life: you want to want to end its life (and logically want to 
not want to ignore its plight). There are desires, second order ones (the desire to foster or 
                                                          
8 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (London: Hackett, 1983). 
9 Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Philosophical Investigation (London: Continuum, 2006), 343.  
10 I ignore the controversial empirical claim that there is a causal relationship between consumption 
and violence to others. See Diane Russell, “Pornography and rape: a causal model,” Political Psychology. 
9.1 (1988): 41-73. I have discussed this elsewhere, see Rose, The Ethics and Politics of Pornography, 75-78. 
11 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. Barry Nisbet (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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inculcate the first order desire), which ought to be cultivated because these are those of the 
moral agent.12 Such motivations are values.13 
 
§ 14. The agent should want to not be aroused by sexual violence. This is to make a moral 
judgement, not one of taste and the moral judgement is based on a controversial account of 
what is and what is not good behaviour, value or sexual behaviour. What are the pursuits or 
values of the good sexual being? Now, if someone takes pleasure from scenes which are 
vulgar or disgusting, we treat it as a matter of bad taste and the best that the “ought” can 
hope for, is that one should not take pleasure from such scenes if one wishes to be 
considered a good judge or have a good sense of humour or some such judgement (An 
explanation which is ultimately circular.). What seems at stake is the claim about desirable 
activities and a certain shadowy puritanism that dictates what are and what are not approved 
sexual practices and arousing images.  
 
III. Objectification: Pornography as Knowing   
 
§ 15. Moral wrongdoing has, it seems, less to do with production of sexually violent films 
and more to do with consumption. Following this train of thought allows one to sidestep all 
the worries about the wrongness of sexually explicit graphic novels, literary erotica, 
simulated violence and simulated underage or animated underage participants since the 
wrongdoing is about seeing and consuming these images and words. (See § 2 above.) The 
discourse as a whole is guilty of objectification:  
 
Pornography’s knowledge is harm, because the creation of knowledge, through 
pornography, and the objectification of women by pornography are two sides of 
the very same phenomenon. On MacKinnon’s way of thinking, pornography is 
a certain kind of self-fulfilling projection. That is what makes it a source of 
knowledge, and that is what makes it a kind of objectification. Part of the harm 
is in the shape that is projected: the vision of what women are like—servile, 
inferior, less-than-human. And part of the harm is also in the shaping, the fact 
that the projection becomes, in the contexts of oppression, a self-fulfilling one.14 
 
§ 16. Those consuming or producing pornography may well believe they want to and have a 
right to do so as an expression of their liberty. The mistake, though, is that one can treat 
others in humiliating and degrading ways only if they have consented and because the 
images involve an objectification of general types and not particular individuals, not all 
those affected by the representations have consented. For ease, let us concentrate on 
women as a type: representations of women in sexually violent material (“servile, inferior, 
less-than-human”) objectify women such that it constructs a projection of women as 
“means merely.”15 The critic of pornography assumes he knows better what the actor wants 
because her participation in the film is to promote and maintain institutions and 
conventions which are actually against her interests through the objectification of certain 
                                                          
12 Charles Taylor, “What is human agency?” Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the 
Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy, 67.1 (1971): 5-­20. Please note some second order desires 
might just be trivial and only some are values. 
13 Susan Wolf, Freedom within Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
14 Rae Langton, Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 307. 
15 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 433. 
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images of women which then frustrate her own goals as well as those of other women. She 
wants to achieve value in her life through an institution which actively undermines the 
status of her gender in society and her own possibilities to satisfy herself through her 
projects. If she knew this, she would not participate but her participation illustrates that she 
does not know this, and the critic must make the decision on her behalf. To consume 
pornography is to perpetuate and consolidate the means of this oppression. 
 
§ 17. When my computer crashes and takes with it my article being written, I swear at the 
machine and blame it. This is a subjectification of the computer and it is a mistake. It is not an 
agent, it did not do the crashing. With objectification, the opposite error is committed: I 
categorize an agent as an object, as not having a will of its own and not being able to decide 
for itself. One’s initial metaphysical error has consequences: not only do we understand the 
world wrongly, we also act on the basis of our understanding and do so in morally wrong 
ways. It is as wrong to hit a PC with a cane as it is to assume women, as a group, enjoy 
sexual humiliation and degradation. 
 
§ 18. Nussbaum and Langton list ten ways one can treat a subject as an object.16 I treat a 
subject as an object when I see him or her as: 
 
1. a tool to further my own interests (instrumentality); 
2. lacking autonomy and self-determination (denial of autonomy); 
3. lacking agency and/or activity (inertness); 
4. interchangeable with other objects of the same or other types (fungibility); 
5. something that it is permissible to break up, smash or break into, lacking in 
boundary integrity (violability); 
6. as something that can be owned, exchanged (ownership); 
7. whose feelings and experience need not be considered (denial of subjectivity); 
8. reduced to his or her body or parts of the body; 
9. reduced to his or her appearance; 
10. being silenced. 
 
However, it is obvious that 1, 5, 8 and 9 can all be permissible when conditions of consent 
are met. 6 also in part, again determined by consent and its necessary exit clause (which 
differentiates slavery from labour).17 2, 3, 4, 7 and 10 all rest on the status of the agent as 
agent or the recognition of the agent as self-determining, capable of rational choice and in 
charge of himself or herself. In short, all the conditions of objectification stem from Kant’s 
claim that treat one as an end never merely a means. 
 
§ 19. I can make my inner life appear to you in one way rather than another through the 
free choice of clothes, the purchase of a specific car or mobile phone, using a specific 
accent or diction, aligning myself with certain groups or telling you what I believe and hold 
most dear. These institutions (property, language, et cetera) are media through which my 
selfhood is expressed, through which you understand me as an agent. Objectification—
presenting my inner world in objective form—is a necessary part of human existence and it 
is achieved through institutions which pre-exist the agent and make possible that 
representation. To choose and partake in labour activities makes possible the expression of 
my individuality; if I choose to teach rather than build houses, to act rather than work in 
                                                          
16 Martha Nussbaum, “Objectification,” Philosophy and Public Affairs. 24.4 (1995): 249-291. Rae 
Langton, Sexual Solipsism, Chapter10. 
17 David Edward Rose, The Ethics and Politics of Pornography, Chapter 5. 
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investment banking, and to perform in sexually violent pornographic films rather than 
appear in amateur theatre, I am expressing something I value. Reciprocally so with those 
objects and activities I choose to consume: my clothes tell you of my musical tastes, my car 
of what I believe is a worthwhile life and so on.  
 
§ 20. However, the system of meanings, expectations and institutions including language 
and cultural attitudes can distort and make impossible the proper communication of one’s 
inner will. Imagine moving to a culture where raising one’s hand was an expression of 
dissent (of not wanting to answer a question in class) rather than assent. The agent for the 
first few months in this new culture would be misunderstood and would have to learn to 
comply pretty quickly in order for him to express what he truly wants. The existence of 
pornographic material (whether written, filmed, photographed, drawn) determines the 
understanding of a particular group (women). Violent representation is particularly 
pernicious in that it reinforces the view that women want to be humiliated, are happy to be 
inferior, enjoy being subservient, as having their will ignored and contradicted (of meaning yes 
when they say no). The problem with the representation of sexual violence is that it is based on 
a suspension of disbelief and background lying that the person wants to be hurt, takes 
pleasure from being hurt. 
 
§ 21. Pornography produces knowledge. Propositions are normally understood to mirror 
reality and their truth value is a correlate of their capacity to best represent what is. In a very 
broad sense, then, reality causes the content of propositions. Objectification is a problem 
because it falsely represents reality: the content of the propositions claim that women are 
not agents or are not subjects. However, there are other propositions, normative in nature 
that cause reality to be what it is. So, in the mid-seventeenth century in Europe, a claim that 
had origins in Christianity began to surface: all humans are equal. It was clear that as a 
statement of fact, this was (and perhaps still is) false, but rather it was the declaration of a 
moral and political project which would play out over the next four hundred or so years. 
What the people who held this claim wanted was a world in which this was true and 
through political activity, rebellion and revolution, they made such a statement more or less 
true in the construction of institutions which would guarantee the equality of agents. They 
made the world become what they wanted it to be. The desire then became a truth. The 
internal sentiment that all humans are equal confers a value on an object (members of a 
lower class, women, slaves) which strives to be taken seriously as an objective feature of the 
object. Or, the desire for something to be thus and so generates the belief that something is 
thus and so (so the desire for equality actually makes us believe people are equal and 
solidifies this in institutions which support equal status).  
 
§ 22. Projected desires can also be negative. The most obvious case of such objectification 
occurs in gender and race relations. Every culture has the fall guy for its jokes: the Irish, the 
Polish, the English and so on. The majority of these jokes are not malicious, they ascribe 
the property of foolishness, stinginess or illiteracy to a general category. The problem is that 
at a job interview where one is interviewing a woman and a man, or an Englishman and an 
Irishman, for the same job, deep unconscious associations may impact one’s decision 
making process. The cultural understanding of the individual as an object belonging to a set 
precedes and filters one’s judgement of him or her. The desire of men for women creates 
the relationship between perpetrator and victim in that the woman is cast in the role of 
wanting or asking for it, even if she openly dissents, a stereotype all too prevalent in much 
unreflective pornographic material. The commodification of women’s sexuality through 
pornography is a way to create the coding of desirable women, so that the desires of men 
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are reproduced, and complicity accepted by women who wish to be desired (in order to 
further their own interests) just as the pupil in § 20 must learn the new rules of hand-raising. 
If the women want to have their own interests satisfied in our society, then they must 
conform to what society expects them to be. 
 
§ 23. However, I really want to believe in Santa Claus and become fixated on the idea that 
the impersonator at my local department store in December is, in fact, Santa Claus. My 
desire for there to be a Santa Claus generates the belief that he is Santa Claus and my 
willingness to dote on him confers on him the very values of Santa Claus: generosity, 
patience and kindness. Yet such a belief is untenable because he will take off his costume 
and he won’t come to my house on Christmas Eve. Reality has a tendency to crush 
inappropriate beliefs. I can act in the world to make this true only at the expense of his 
freedom of will: by forcing him to be Santa Claus, to live eleven months of the year in 
Lapland and to descend down all chimneys on Christmas Eve. 
 
§ 24. Sexual objectification is not revealed to be inappropriate in the same way. An 
imagined nightclub prowler has a belief that women are agents with wills of their own and 
the consequence of such a belief frustrates his desire to take non-consensual delight in their 
mere appearance or in treating them as objects of consumption as they pass him by in the 
club. To further his interests, it would be better that they were mere objects, subject to his 
will and choice, without desires and an inner life of their own. To view them in this way 
requires epistemic bad faith: he must repress the knowledge that they are subjects and hope 
that this repression is not revealed to him at an inopportune moment. His consumption of 
sexually violent material allows him to perform his master-stroke of epistemic bad faith, to 
create the neurosis akin to that of the Santa Claus believer. What separates them is that the 
Santa Claus believer is vulnerable to the revelation that his belief is false because the world 
will not conform to his desires, whereas the male fabricated world of social reality maintains 
and supports the epistemic bad faith of the nightclub prowler. His belief is not vulnerable in 
the same way because it is shared and being shared with his peers: when the women tries to 
dissent, she is merely playing the game, pretending not to be what she is, as the films often 
portray. 
 
§ 25. A consequent is that one cannot find fault with, or the same fault with, gay sexual 
violence or female on male sexual violence. (See § 35 below.) 
 
§ 26. However, let us return to the subjectification of the computer and my smashing it with 
a baseball bat to punish it. I am well aware that my behaviour is absurd, that the computer 
cannot be blamed. My violent outburst is merely a way to diffuse frustration and anger. I 
know that the computer is a thing and that I am making a category mistake when I ascribe 
certain properties to it, so at worse I am guilty of an epistemic bad faith. However, from 
such bad faith, no moral normative consequences of worth follow as they would if I were to 
demand that the police arrest the computer. What is significant about this attitude, though, 
is the parallel of epistemic bad faith with objectifying judgements and its origin in human 
interest. Let us return to our nightclub crawler. What is true about his comportment toward 
the women is that he knows that they are subjects, but forgets, represses or denies such a 
status. His behaviour is reprehensible for this fact: there is an appropriate way of 
understanding what is before him, a demand made by the nature of the thing to be known, 
that he, because it suits his interests or just because he can, given the structures of his 
consciousness, revel in denying. And unlike the computer, moral consequences follow from 
his epistemic bad faith: whereas the computer can be understood wrongly, this is neither 
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here nor there for the computer, but it is very significant for the women to be understood 
as they are. The women would object to his treating them as objects and they would, if 
asked, demand that he stops. 
 
§ 27. Fiction mediates our own expression by replying on a background of fact. Watching, 
reading or consuming it involves learning from it, but given the nature of fictional works 
the factual web that supports a work of fiction can generate mistakes in readers. First, a 
reader may mistake background for mere fiction (and does not learn what he should learn). 
Second, a reader may mistake mere fiction for background (and learn what he should not); 
for example, that time-travel is possible through wormholes. The latter would seem to be 
the case with pornography: the pornographic film asserts that “Women mean yes when they 
say no,” or “Women need to be brought to an understanding of the own innermost 
desires.”  Just as deep cultural associations affect my deliberative choice between two 
applicants for the one job, unbeknownst to me due to my having learned a trait of a race 
which is not true and does not apply to the individuals before me, so too with pornography 
and women. Or, pornography may represent women as compliant, yet coquettish and such 
a characterization is necessary for the narrative to function (hence is background) in the 
same way time travel is a necessary background for certain science fiction films yet is fiction. 
As such, if the background structure is taken to be true, then pornographic films affect the 
possibility to enunciate and the effectiveness of an act of dissent. One can go further: the 
fact-fiction blurring is intentionally brought about by the agency of someone who has 
something to gain from such and such a mistake. Think of an actual woman in the images 
from Crepax’s Valentina (fig. 1). What would her feelings be if it were a real, unchosen 
situation? She would be terrified, scared, in pain—we as viewer would want to free her 
unless she explicitly forbade us. The only way we are aroused if we think she secretly enjoys 
it, has consented. One’s immediate encounters with others in a sexual situation are 
sometimes corrupted because one possesses background beliefs that may well be false and 
obstructs the proper expression of agreement or refusal. 
 
§ 28. Pornography’s silencing of women rests on a claim about the construction of social 
reality: objectification creates, maintains and informs social and cultural conditions of 
understanding such that it is easier for knowing subjects (both male and female) to perform 
the epistemic bad faith required to objectify persons belonging to a specific set and such 
objectification has negative normative consequences in that it undermines the moral value 
of a subset of persons by reinforcing inequality (subordinating) and denying the 
autonomous and rational status of this subset (silencing).  
 
IV. Objectification versus Alienation   
 
§ 29. A proper understanding of objectification differentiates between objectification and 
alienation. Objectification in and of itself is not bad. Objectification occurs when the 
product of my activity is the objectification of my will in the world, the object is recognised 
as mine, as an expression of myself. Objectification is negative when it is alienation, when 
the product of my activity is taken away from me and posited as not-mine, or when it makes 
it impossible for me to express my will as I would wish in the world. A group is alienated in 
that they cannot find satisfaction in those structures which render them meaningful agents. 
Subjective freedom stipulates that a self-understanding be recognized as valid for the agent 
by himself because I am not “at home” when I act on external dictates imposed on me. The 
moral subject must endorse the good as his or her own good. Objective freedom is the 
institutional and social structure of the world which makes it possible for the person or 
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subject to satisfy his or her subjective freedom.18 The objective freedom of an agent is the 
institutions, moral values, social fabric, roles, civil, economic and political structures and so 
on that guarantee his or her identification as a subject of his or her own deeds and his or 
her recognition as a moral agent (and not an animal, a very young child, a slave and so on). 
So, for example, capitalism, the family and the Christian tradition are all forms of objective 
freedom: they assign roles and duties that determine how we behave in certain situations 
and in behaving in accordance with their dictates (or, at times, violating them) we are able to 
be, and also understood as, an agent.  
 
§ 30. Representations of sexual violence, it could be argued, alienate because they frustrate 
and obstruct free self-understanding. Women understood by consumers of pornography 
and sexually violent imagery are silenced, because their protestation is ignored (“She says no, 
but she means…”), cries of pain and expressions of humiliation are interpreted as expressions 
of pleasure, implorations to stop are interpreted as encouragement to continue. Women 
cannot recognise themselves in the images portrayed and their agency is negated in actual 
relationships because what they say is never understood to be what they mean. They cannot 
be “at home” in the cultural discourse which maintains and supports their expression. They 
are alienated from their cultural understanding. One might say, violent pornography is 
wrong because it is a representation and hence a reinforcement of gender hierarchical power 
relationships; predominantly man or men on women. This means we can make the same 
judgement about graphic novels as well as films, and also mainstream cinema, such as 
Hostel II. Furthermore, there is no difference between a simulated and a real scene. 
 
§ 31. Inequality arises from the creation of ideology which supports interest-driven attitudes 
and ideology is insulated from critique by the silencing of dissent through social and cultural 
institutions (including pornography) which reinforce the “truth” of these attitudes. Such 
institutions, discourses and social practices subordinate the wills of those silenced by the 
power structures through producing individual wants, needs and interests consistent with 
the original desires of the creators. The oppression is so great that women begin to falsely 
recognise themselves in the representations of the discourse of pornography; their wants are 
not considered worthy of equal respect, or they are obstructed from articulating their own 
wants because language and the discourse of sex make it possible for them to express their 
wants only at the cost of their own rationality. Pornography depicts a world which rests on 
a particular view of what a sexual woman is in order to satisfy the interests of the non-
woman. And women, then, are alienated from their own determination and products of 
their wills. 
 
§ 32. To say, though, that a decision has been taken by a will other than the woman’s, that is 
by the Male’s wish to subordinate women in such a way, and to conceive of such an act as a 
momentary, ahistorical and precise act of will is to rely on a rather mythical, metaphysically 
problematic conception of the Male. Langton establishes the critique of pornography on its 
role in projection with a rather rhetorical thought experiment.19 She imagines a conspiracy 
designed and implemented by, one assumes, an evil, male genius whereby the origins of the 
need to see women as objects is separated from that need and given the convincing veneer 
of naturalistic science. Moreover, the limits and rules of what constitutes science is set by 
the same male genius who also dictates what is to count as evidence that confirms or 
falsifies a belief. Over a period of time, the cultural and social institutions of the world 
                                                          
18 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §132. 
19 Rae Langton, Sexual Solipsism, 261-266. 
108 David Edward Rose 
Dirty Pleasures: The Ethics of the Representation of Sexual Violence 
 
created by this genius will begin to actually confirm these propositions as truth: if a certain 
race is kept in slavery for a period of generations and excluded from education, then such a 
race will in fact exhibit the properties of servility and dependence. The problem with her 
picture is twofold. One, her account of objectification depends upon an original act of will, 
a decision by one or a group of males to instigate a system of domination through language 
and cultural institutions; the “ur-Father” of feminism. And it also depends on placing the 
blame on those individuals who benefit from but did not create this system. Yet, if the 
silenced cannot overthrow the system, the voiced do not actively reinforce it. They are as 
much victims as the women since their role in the system is equally determined. Who is it 
that actually lies and creates the fiction which then becomes “reality”? It is not a particular 
male or even an historical one. Looking for blame in a modern sense of trying to identify 
the agent (the actor in the film, the consumer or the producer of the film) may well be the 
greatest distortion of all. Two, such an account undermines what it seeks to defend: the 
autonomy of women. It paints a picture of a “woman” who exists silently and outside of the 
system of power and unable to influence it. Surely feminism requires a better heroine. 
 
§ 33. Moreover, if the existence of pornography creates, maintains and informs social and 
cultural conditions of understanding such that it is easier for knowing subjects (both male 
and female) to perform the epistemic bad faith required to objectify persons, why is the 
critique of pornography explicitly feminist? There are male actors in the films as well and 
they, too, behave in ways that may make women form false beliefs: men are only interested 
in sex, men comply with the desire to make love without reservation, plumbers are horny, 
and the average size of the male member is about twelve inches long. Such background may 
create a situation in which a woman (or another man) may form beliefs about the individual 
man in front of them because the woman wants it to be thus and so. Neither “male” nor 
“female” feel at home, let alone the bisexual, the homosexual, the asexual and so on. What 
the feminist will say is that such beliefs are not supported by the society at large, though. 
They will be more akin to the belief that the man in the store is actually Santa Claus (see 
§ 23 above): if I were to share such beliefs, others would dismiss them, whereas the beliefs 
about women are more likely to be supported by others because the cultural conditions of 
inequality support them. Male beliefs, in short, can move from unstable objectification to 
cultural alienation. The second thing the feminist may say is that whereas the background 
lies, and the epistemic bad faith of the male is in his interest, the background beliefs of the 
woman about men (based on pornography films) are also in his (and not her) interest. 
 
§ 34. There is a difference between the institutions that exist to maintain and support the 
social reality of equality between individuals and those that exist to maintain and support 
the presentation of groups as inferior, servile and not fully rational in the interests of the 
constructors of social reality. In Hegel and also in Marx, the opposite of alienation is 
freedom and homeliness or interdependent freedom, an act is an expression of will when 
the agent who creates (i) sees what he produces and consumes as worthwhile and valuable 
to him and others; and (ii) knows that it is his free choice to produce and consume it (that is 
participate in the decision-making process which decides which goods are to be 
produced).20 Alienation occurs when systems of domination and control determine the 
expressions and consumption of desires without the participation of those agents. The 
existence of pornography creates, maintains and informs social and cultural conditions of 
                                                          
20 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Right.  Karl Marx, The German Ideology, trans. S. 
Ryazanskaya (New York: Prometheus Books, 1988). 
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understanding such that it is easier for knowing subjects (both male and female) to perform 
the epistemic bad faith required to objectify persons belonging to a specific set; and such 
objectification has negative normative consequences in that it undermines the moral value 
of a subset of persons by reinforcing inequality (subordinating) and denying the 
autonomous and rational status of this subset (silencing). That pornography aids in the 
objectification of persons is neither here nor there. It, in this respect, performs the role of 
many other institutions, conventions and meanings in that it sets down the manner in which 
we can understand others and their behaviour and also express ourselves. To describe such 
action as epistemic bad faith is rhetoric, because it could easily be understood as a way to 
subjectify myself and others: through these understandings I allow my individuality to be 
stated and respected. The trouble is not an original act of will on the parts of a group of 
males or the consolidation of inequality by an actual group of males, but that the interests at 
stake are commodity production and profit. One cannot feel at home in the representation 
of sexual activity because it represents behaviours and expectations which meet the 
accumulation of capital and not free choices of human beings. 
 
V. Pornography and Capitalism    
 
§ 35. The representation of our sexuality which exist is for the most part determined by 
capital. There is no original act of will which generates a hierarchy of power just the system 
of production and consumption which alienates us both from the producing and consuming 
activity. Nowhere does the female, male, homosexual, heterosexual or individual himself, 
herself or zirself choose the means and discourse of expression which is wholly dominated 
by the distorting need to accrue capital. For the most part, the production and creation of 
sexual discourse and tropes is produced by those with an interest in commodifying it and 
not those who seek to freely express themselves in it.  
 
§ 36. A proper critique of sexually violent imagery should then be aimed at the cultural 
conditions of understanding (capitalism) and not some imagined individual who seeks to 
oppress a group. By assuming that one can trace the wrongdoing to a decision on the part 
of a fixed subjectivity, one undermines any real understanding of sexual representation. 
Pornography is a capitalistic simulation of alienation. The sexual other is understood as an 
instrument for my pleasure and the individual’s sexuality is seen as a commodity to be 
exchanged in the marketplace. The subject cannot feel at home in the modes of behaviour 
that constitute his or her sexuality (we do it despite ourselves) and we are in competition 
with others because our body can be replaced by any other object. Our sexuality and its 
representation, through which we find meaning (pornography), is distorted by capitalism. 
The existence of images of violent pornography (whether simulated or real), like the 
existence of pornography representing children (whether real or not), is wrong because it 
distorts the relationships between individuals and makes proper free agreement and consent 
between individuals impossible and corrupt. The atomism of modern society and the 
representations of sexual relationships in the media frustrate rather than develop sexual 
relationships. Expressions of sexual activity can only meet free conditions when they are 
socially self-determined activities and not one of commodity value production. The violent 
nature of these images is a red herring.  
 
§ 37. So, should violent sexual imagery like pornography in general be prohibited because it 
is alienating? The opposite of alienation is free activity when the agent can find satisfaction 
in those activities maintained and supported by the institutions and expectations of culture. 
One cannot ban or prohibit the whole of culture and such a goal is undesirable anyway: one 
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annihilates the very means of one’s own free expression. The discourse of pornography, 
with all its variety and flavours and the social reality it constructs, is necessary for individuals 
to find satisfaction in their relationships: otherwise we would have to always start from zero 
and rebuild everything, the expectations, tropes of behaviour and possible models of 
satisfaction. The variety of pornography, including the expression of tastes in sexual 
violence, so long as they are regulated by state control, allows us to find objectifications in 
which we can feel at home. Prohibition undermines state regulation and protection of 
participants and removes the means for self-expression. The requirement is that we, as 
individuals, participate in the construction of that sexual reality through engaging with the 
productive process and not ignoring or pushing it into the shadows.  
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